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1. A Picture of the Commentator Sthiramati
　　Sthiramati of the Indian Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda school was roughly a contemporary of 
Dharmapāla and Bhāviveka, and he was also the person whose views were at the greatest vari-
ance with those of Dharmapāla. He is also well-known for having been a leading figure at the 
Buddhist university of Valabhī, which was one of the two main centres of Buddhism in India 
along with the university at Nālandā, where Dharmapāla and Śīlabhadra were based. As well, 
he is known as a great commentator who wrote commentaries on many treatises, including 
works by Vasubandhu. This is the picture of Sthiramati that has become established today. 
But when one examines the contents of the extant commentaries attributed to Sthiramati, one 
finds aspects that cause one to question the above traditional view of Sthiramati. I have previ-
ously pointed out in several articles some of the grounds for questioning the traditional view, 
and here I wish to reexamine our picture of the commentator Sthiramati on the basis of my 
previous investigations.
1.1. Traditional Accounts of Sthiramati
　　How was the above picture of Sthiramati created? As a starting point for considering 
this question, I wish to take up vol. 2 of Hirakawa Akira’s Indo Bukkyōshi (Hirakawa 1979: 
228–232), according to which the examination of Sthiramati’s dates began with an article by 
Ui Hakuju (1965a). Ui’s determination of Sthiramati’s dates had its origins in G. Bühler’s pro-
nouncements on the subject (Bühler 1877). Citing the reference to “the Bodhisattvas Guṇamati 
and Sthiramati” in Xuanzang’s 玄奘 Da Tang xiyuji 大唐西域記 and emboldened by the exis-
tence of material proof of the existence of the name “Sthiramati” in copperplate inscriptions 
from Valabhī, Bühler asserted that Sthiramati of Valabhī was “no doubt” the commentator 
Sthiramati. Bühler subsequently published several more studies in which he maintained this 
position. His views were endorsed by Sylvain Lévi (1896), who showed that Sthiramati had 
been a contemporary of the king Guhasena (r. 558–566 C.E.) of Valabhī, and on the basis of 
Lévi’s research Erich Frauwallner (1961) estimated Sthiramati’s dates to have been 510–570. 
This current of research was continued by Kajiyama Yūichi (1965), who, basing himself on 
the fact that Sthiramati, Bhāviveka, Dharmapāla, and Avalokitavrata quote and criticize each 
other in their writings, demonstrated that Sthiramati (510–570), Bhāviveka (480–570), and 
Dharmapāla (530–561) were contemporaries and thus endorsed Frauwallner’s view.
　　If we consider the treatment of source materials by Ui (1965a: 111–114), the start-
ing point of the above overview, we find that he based himself on the Da Tang gu sanzang 
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Xuanzang fashi xingzhuang 大唐故三藏玄奘法師行狀 (T. no. 2052), Da Tang Daci’ensi sanzang 
fashi zhuan 大唐大慈恩寺三藏法師傳 (T. no. 2053), Da Tang xiyuji (T. no. 2087), Si shamen 
Xuanzang shangbiao ji 寺沙門玄奘上表記 (T. no. 2119), and Xu gaoseng zhuan 續高僧傳 (T. no. 
2060) and “consult[ed] as necessary other works.” Ui further wrote, “Because, owing to the 
nature of the currently available materials, it is quite difficult to obtain any definite and fixed 
dates for any of the events, I will do no more than merely give an indication of what seems to 
be true, and therefore we must needs place our hopes on research by other meticulous schol-
ars.” Apart from the date of Xuanzang’s death (664 C.E.),1 the dates of no other Indian masters 
have been established, and the dates of Sthiramati, Bhāviveka, Dharmapāla, etc., have been 
calculated on the basis of the above-mentioned works and what Kuiji 窺基 recorded.
　　But at some point Ui’s reservations expressed by qualifications such as “perhaps” and 
“maybe” seem to have acquired authority and turned into definitive statements. Depending 
on the source, Śīlabhadra (Jiexian 戒賢) is said to have been either 106 or 160 years old 
when Xuanzang met him, while Jayasena (Shengjun 勝軍), whom Xuanzang accompanied, 
was more than 100 years old, and Śīlabhadra was one year older than Dharmapāla, who died in 
his thirties. Ui himself states that there are scant grounds for any of these traditional accounts.
　　There are also questions surrounding the relationship between Sthiramati (Anhui 安慧) 
and Paramārtha. Yūki Reimon (1999 [1980]) pointed out that the view that Paramārtha had be-
longed to a current of thought deriving from Anhui, put forward in earlier studies, originated 
in the Shōdaijōronshaku ryakusho 攝大乘論釋略疏 by the Japanese scholar-monk Fujaku 普寂 
(1707–81),2 a fact that had also been pointed out in Ui 1965b. It was, in other words, recognized 
that there were no solid grounds for the above traditional accounts.
　　Next, the sources that have until now been adduced for linking Valabhī and Sthiramati 
are mainly the Da Tang Daci’ensi sanzang fashi zhuan (T50.243b9: “Falapi” 伐臘毘 [Valabhī]; 
T50.244a9: “Anhui”) and the Da Tang xiyuji (T51.936b16: “Falapi”; T51.936c2: “Jianhui” 堅
慧). Both of these works were compiled by Xuanzang’s disciples on the basis of Xuanzang’s 
own accounts, and they have been considered to record that Sthiramati was active in Valabhī, 
as a result of which they have served as the main grounds for linking Sthiramati to Valabhī.
　　In the Tibetan tradition, biographies of Sthiramati are found in the History of Buddhism by 
Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290–1364) (Obermiller 1932: 147–149) and in the History of Buddhism 
in India by Tāranātha (1573–1615?) (Teramoto 1974: 195–198). According to these works, 
Sthiramati wrote commentaries on most of Vasubandhu’s works and also wrote a commentary 
on the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. But both Bu ston and Tāranātha question whether the author 
of the latter commentary was the same Sthiramati. According to Bhavya’s biography in the 
History of Buddhism in India (Teramoto: 205–208), Bhavya’s disciples went to Nālandā and de-
feated Sthiramati’s disciples in debate. Both Bu ston and Tāranātha are of the view that these 
accounts require further examination. According to Teramoto’s translation of the History of 
Buddhism in India, Sthiramati had ties with Nālandā. To the best of my knowledge, there are 
no accounts in the Tibetan tradition that link Sthiramati to Valabhī.3
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1.2. Sthiramati Appearing in Inscriptions
　　Evidence linking Sthiramati to Valabhī is provided by inscriptions from Valabhī. There 
exists earlier research on the Valabhī inscriptions by Shizutani Masao 静谷正雄 and others, 
but here I will use the studies by Tsukamoto Keishō (1996: 526–542) and Marlene Njammasch 
(2001: 210ff.). The inscription numbers used below are those assigned by Tsukamoto.
　　First, as regards the inscriptions’ dates, inscription no. 7 (copperplate inscription) is said 
to date from the year 269 of the Valabha era and inscription no. 21 (copperplate inscription) 
from the year 343 of the same era. According to Alberuni’s India (vol. 2: 7), the epoch of the 
Valabha era falls 241 years later than the epoch of the Śaka (or Śālivāhana) era, which is 
considered to have begun in 78 C.E. This means that inscription no. 7 dates from 588 C.E. 
(269+241+78 = 588) and inscription no. 21 from 662 C.E. (343+241+78 = 662). These dates may 
be regarded as definitive in terms of the currently recognized chronology.
Inscription no. 7 (588 C.E.; Tsukamoto 1996: 524)
(Summary) “Recipient of the grant: The monastery Śrī-Bappapāda in Valabhī, founded by 
the Master and Venerable Sthiramati”
Valabhīyāṃ ācāryya-bhadanta-Sthiramati-kārita-śrī-Bappapādīya-vihāre
Inscription no. 21 (662 C.E.; Tsukamoto 1996: 541)
(Summary) “Recipient of the grant: Monastery founded by the Master and Monk Vi-
malagupta of the village Kukkurāṇaka, within the monastery founded by the Master and 
Venerable Sthiramati, included in the Ḍuḍḍa monastery complex”
1. Ḍuḍḍāvihāramaṇḍalāntarggat’ ācāryya-bhikṣu-Sthiramati-kārita-vihāre ācāryyabhikṣu-
Vimalagupta-kārita-bhagava...
2. Ḍuḍḍāvihāramaṇḍala-praveśya-Kukkurāṇakagrāma-niviṣṭ’ ācāryyabhikṣu-Vimalagupta-
kārita- 
　　Tsukamoto (1996: 527) writes with respect to inscription no. 21, “(6) Sthiramativihāra: 
monastery founded by the master and monk Sthiramati (different person from the Sthiramati 
of (11)),” and with respect to inscription no. 7, “(11) śrī-Bappapādīya-vihāra: monastery named 
after Bappapāda, an ancestor of the Maitraka dynasty, and revered by members of the royal 
family; founded by the master and venerable Sthiramati (different person from the Sthiramati 
of (6)).” Unfortunately, Tsukamoto does not explain why he considers the Sthiramati men-
tioned in inscription no. 7 to have been a different person from the Sthiramati mentioned in 
inscription no. 21.
　　Njammasch (2001: 20–21), on the other hand, considers the Sthiramatis mentioned in 
these two inscriptions to have been the same person. She begins her examination by posing 
the question of whether or not the Sthiramatis appearing in the two inscriptions are the same 
person (“Aus der Inschrift des Jahres 588 n.Chr. ergibt sich auch die Frage, ob das von Sthira-
mati erbaute Śrī-Bappapādīya-vihāra mit dem im Jahre 662 n.Chr. erwähnten Kloster identisch 
ist, von dem es ebenfalls heißt, das es von Sthiramati erbaut worden war.”). Having considered 
the relationship between the monasteries mentioned in the two inscriptions, she notes that 
because there is a gap of 74 years (662－588 = 74) between the dates of the two inscriptions, it 
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is conceivable that the Sthiramati in the 588 inscription may not have been the Sthiramati men-
tioned in the 662 inscription (“Es wären natürlich auch noch andere Deutungen möglich, z.B. 
muß der Sthiramati des Jahres 588 nicht der des Jahres 662 n.Chr. gewesen sein.”). But her 
formulation implies that they were the same person. Then, using the Da Tang xiyuji, based on 
Xuanzang’s account, as her main evidence, Njammasch states that the Sthiramati appearing in 
these two inscriptions is the Sthiramati mentioned by Xuanzang and the renowned Sthiramati 
of the Yogācāra school who wrote commentaries on Vasubandhu’s works and that he lived in 
the sixth century (“Sthiramati war Philosoph der buddhistischen Yogācāraschule und lebte 
im 6. Jh. n.Chr.”). She also maintains that in the 630s when Xuanzang was in India he knew 
that Sthiramati had lived in Valabhī and certainly taught there (“In den dreißiger Jahren des 7. 
Jh. n.Chr. war dem Xuan Zang noch bekannt, daß Sthiramati in Valabhī gelebt und sicherlich 
gelehrt hatte.”). She further adds that Xuanzang also mentions Sthiramati as one of the fa-
mous teachers at the Buddhist university of Nālandā (“Xuan Zang erwähnt übrigens Sthirama-
ti auch unter den berühmten Lehrern der buddhistischen Universität von Nālandā.”). In other 
words, the chief grounds for Njammasch’s equating of the Sthiramatis mentioned in the two 
inscriptions is the traditional view shaped by Xuanzang’s account and other Chinese sources.
　　In view of the fact that the Tibetan tradition mentions Sthiramati in connection with 
Nālandā and Xuanzang, too, refers to him as a renowned teacher at Nālandā, it is quite conceiv-
able, even without invoking the image of an itinerant monk, that Sthiramati travelled between 
the Buddhist universities at Valabhī and Nālandā as circumstances required.
　　When the traditional accounts are considered in conjunction with the inscriptions, it does 
indeed seem plausible that the Sthiramati who wrote several commentaries on Vasubandhu’s 
works was the same person as the Sthiramati mentioned in the inscriptions. But there is no 
textual evidence that the author of the commentaries attributed to Sthiramati was the Sthira-
mati mentioned in the inscriptions, nor is there any guarantee that the Sthiramati mentioned 
in the two inscriptions was one and the same person.
1.3. Textual Evidence in Debates between the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra Schools
　　The works to be considered here are Bhāviveka’s Madhyamakahṛdaya-kārikā, 
Prajñāpradīpa, and (in Chinese translation) Dasheng zhangzhen lun 大乘掌珍論, Sthirama-
ti’s Dasheng zhongguan shilun 大乘中觀釋論, Dharmapāla’s Dasheng guang bailun shilun 
大乘廣百論釋論, and Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra (as well as his Prasannapadā and 
Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti). Studies of Madhyamaka criticism of the Yogācāra school based on these 
works include those by Yamaguchi Susumu (1941), Yasui Kōsai (1961), Kajiyama Yūichi 
(1963), Ejima Yasunori (2003 [1992]), and Kishine Toshiyuki (2001).
　　There are several aspects of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda thought that are raised by the 
Mādhyamikas Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti as targets of their criticism, among which the fol-
lowing would seem necessary to be considered in the present context. As is indicated by 
Yamaguchi (1941: 188), the Mādhyamika method of criticism was such that when the target 
of its criticism was deemed to propound “existence,” it regarded its target as a realist posi-
???
Was There Really Only One Commentator Named Sthiramati?
43
tion and criticized its grounds, and when its target was deemed to propound “non-existence,” 
it took the position of investigating its grounds. The prime example is the statement in the 
Madhyāntavibhāga that false discrimination both exists and does not exist. There are also 
instances in which the criticism takes the form of the suggestion that an assertion of the 
Yogācāra school is no different from the position of the Madhyamaka school (e.g., Yamaguchi 
1941: 372). If one takes the view that originally practitioners of the Yogācāra school carried over 
Nāgārjuna’s thinking, such criticism might end up corroborating this relationship between the 
two. As is noted by Ejima (2003: 536) in connection with Bhāviveka and Dharmapāla, there are 
many aspects in which Dignāga, Bhāviveka, Sthiramati, Dharmapāla, and Candrakīrti seem 
to be arguing at cross-purposes with one another. While it cannot be denied that some of the 
mutual criticism is merely intended to provoke an argument, it is at least certain on the basis 
of this textual evidence that these scholars were historical figures who actually lived, albeit 
perhaps at slightly different times, and were in a milieu that made it possible for them to argue 
with one another.4
　　Avalokitavrata’s Prajñāpradīpa-ṭīkā, which survives only in Tibetan translation and is 
quoted by Kajiyama (1963), mentions the two masters Blo brtan (Sthiramati) and Chos 
skyong (Dharmapāla) and confirms that they engaged in debate with Bhāviveka (Bhavya), the 
author of the Prajñāpradīpa. However, rather than constituting exchanges of views, their re-
spective criticisms would seem to be one-sided disquisitions on their own views, and therefore 
these references do not necessarily prove that they were contemporaries.
　　As for the Dasheng zhongguan shilun (T. no. 1567) by Anhui (Sthiramati), which was trans-
lated into Chinese by Weijing 惟淨 and others in the Song period, and the Dasheng guang 
bailun shilun (T. no. 1571) by Dharmapāla, translated by Xuanzang, the question of whether 
or not their contents are consistent with the contents of Sthiramati’s works preserved in the 
original Sanskrit and in Tibetan translation is one that will need to be examined in the future.
1.4. The Traditions of Chinese Vijñānavāda Doctrine
　　In Chinese Vijñānavāda doctrine, the traditions of which Japanese Hossō 法相 doctrine 
inherited, the view that Sthiramati (Anhui) was the scholar whose views were at the great-
est variance with those of Dharmapāla (Hufa 護法) became widely established on the basis 
of a well-known mnemonic, according to which Sthiramati (Anhui), Nanda (Nantuo 難陀), 
Dignāga (Chenna 陳那), and Dharmapāla (Hufa) posited one, two, three, and four aspects 
of consciousness respectively. It has been assumed that this Anhui was Sthiramati and Hufa 
was Dharmapāla. If we apply this tradition to India, it means that Sthiramati propounded a 
one-aspect theory of consciousness, while Dharmapāla propounded a fourfold division of 
consciousness, which added to the three aspects of perceived object (grāhya), perceiving 
consciousness (grāhaka), and self-awareness or self-authentication (svasaṃvedana) a fourth 
aspect that authenticated self-authentication. It can be confirmed in works composed in India 
that Dignāga added svasaṃvedana (svasaṃ√vid) to grāhya and grāhaka,5 and this provides 
textual evidence for these three aspects. But the aspect that authenticates self-authentica-
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tion (zheng zizheng fen 證自證分) cannot be found prior to Xuanzang’s translations of the 
Buddhabhūmiśāstra and Cheng weishi lun 成唯識論. The Cheng weishi lun is said to have 
been composed by “Hufa and others,” with the views of Hufa being deemed to represent the 
orthodox view, which then became established as orthodox Chinese Vijñānavāda doctrine. 
But works attributed to Dharmapāla exist only in Chinese translation and cannot be directly 
equated with Dharmapāla’s ideas. In addition, Śīlabhadra’s Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, which 
survives only in Tibetan translation and according to the traditional account ought to have 
inherited Dharmapāla’s ideas, also shows no evidence of that aspect of consciousness that 
authenticates self-authentication. The fact that the equivalent of zheng zizheng fen appearing in 
Xuanzang’s translation of the Buddhabhūmiśāstra is not found in the corresponding passage 
of Śīlabhadra’s Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna means that it is by no means certain that the views 
of Hufa, regarded as the orthodox views of Chinese Vijñānavāda doctrine, and the views of 
Dharmapāla were identical in the contents of their ideas.
　　Let us consider the section on the four aspects of consciousness in the Cheng weishi lun 
(T31.10c4–12).
These four parts may be reduced to three, because the fourth may be included in the 
self-authenticating part. Or they may be reduced to two, because the last three are all 
subjects with objects; that is, all three are included in the seeing part. “Seeing” means 
having objects. Or they may be reduced to one, because there is no difference in their 
substance. As a verse in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra says:
Mind, attached to itself,
Evolves resembling the external realm.
What is perceived by it does not exist,
And therefore it is said that there is only mind.
Thus in many places in the scriptures it is said that there is only the one mind. This “one 
mind” also includes mental activities. Therefore, the mode of activity of consciousness is 
perception, and perception is the seeing part of consciousness.6
如是四分或攝爲三。第四攝入自證分故。或攝爲二。後三倶是能縁性故皆見分攝。此言
見者是能縁義。或攝爲一。體無別故。如入楞伽伽他中説
由自心執著　心似外境轉
彼所見非有　是故説唯心
如是處處説唯一心。此一心言亦攝心所。故識行相即是了別。了別即是識之見分。
　　Here it is said of the one-aspect theory “Or they (i.e., the four parts) may be reduced to 
one, because there is no difference in their substance” (underlined section). This “one” re-
fers to the fact that although consciousness may be divided into four aspects̶objective part, 
seeing part, self-authenticating part, and part that authenticates self-authentication̶they are 
only the one mind. This explanation of the four aspects of consciousness follows on from the 
explanation of the three aspects of consciousness, which ends as follows (T31.10b13–16):
As a verse in the Pramāṇasamuccaya says:
The image that resembles an external object is the cognised object;
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That which grasps the image and that which is self-authenticating
Are the cogniser and the fruit [of cognition].
There is no difference in the substance of these three.
如集量論伽他中説
似境相所量　能取相自證
即能量及果　此三體無別
　　This corresponds to verse 10 in chapter 1 of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya, in which the 
underlined section reads (Steinkellner et al. 2005: 76.12): trayaṃ nātaḥ pṛthakkṛtam “There-
fore the three are not separate.” In the Pramāṇasamuccaya-ṭīkā it similarly says: trayasyāpi 
tattvato ’pariniṣpannatvāt, na jñānāt pṛthakkaraṇam “Because those three are not truly es-
tablished, they are not differentiated from knowledge.” This means that, in the context of the 
fourfold division of consciousness, the four aspects represent a single indivisible conscious-
ness, or one mind.
　　Meanwhile, as regards Sthiramati’s one-aspect theory, a headnote in the Shindō 新導 
edition of the Cheng weishi lun (vol. 1: 3) states that “the master Sthiramati only posited the 
self-authenticating part” (安慧論師唯立自證分), and it is evident that this was the established 
view in Chinese Vijñānavāda doctrine. However, no sources are given, and the grounds for 
this statement are unclear. But in the Bukkyō taikei 仏教大系 edition of the Cheng weishi lun 
(vol. 1: 138) we find the following quotation from the Cheng weishi lun shuji 成唯識論述記 
(T43.241b7–9):
Sthiramati explains, saying, “[When it says in the Cheng weishi lun,] ‘Transformation 
means that the substance of consciousness evolves to resemble two parts,’ the two parts 
have no substance and are due to attachment to all-pervasive discrimination. Apart from 
a buddha, in bodhisattvas and so on the inherent substance of consciousnesses is the 
self-authenticating part.”
安惠解云。變謂識體轉似二分。二分體無。遍計所執。除佛以外菩薩已還。諸識自體即
自證分。
　　If we further look for the source of the final part of this passage in the Cheng weishi lun, 
we find the following passage (T31.10b7):
The inherent substance that serves as support for the objective and seeing [parts] is 
called the [substratal] entity, which is the self-authenticating part.
相見所依自體名事。即自證分。
　　According to this passage, “inherent substance,” “[substratal] entity,” and “self-authen-
ticating part” are all equivalent, and the single aspect of the one-aspect theory is the self-au-
thenticating aspect of consciousness.7 But in the Cheng weishi lun there is no evidence of any 
intention to attribute this view to Sthiramati. A reference to “Sthiramati’s one part” can also be 
found in another headnote of the Shindō edition (vol. 2: 31), but again the source is unclear. 
The Bukkyō taikei edition of the Cheng weishi lun (vol. 2: 129) quotes the following statement 
from the Cheng weishi lun shuji (T43.320c20–22):
But Sthiramati posited only one part, Nanda posited two parts, Dignāga posited three 
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parts, and Dharmapāla posited four parts.
然安惠立唯一分　難陀立二分　陳那立三分　護法立四分
　　Again, according to the Cheng weishi lun shuji, “the ancient venerables prior to Sthira-
mati all taught two parts” (T43.242a11–12 [cf. Bukkyō taikei, vol. 1: 141]: 安惠已前諸古徳等皆
説二分) and “alternatively, they in fact taught one part, like Sthiramati” (T43.242a24–25 [cf. 
Bukkyō taikei, vol. 1: 151]: 或實説一分如安慧). It is thus evident that the view that Sthiramati 
(Anhui) propounded a one-aspect theory of consciousness was the orthodox view of Chinese 
Vijñānavāda doctrine. There is little clear evidence of this view in Huizhao’s 惠沼 Cheng weishi 
lun liaoyi deng 成唯識論了義燈 or Zhizhou’s 智周 Cheng weishi lun yanmi 成唯識論演秘. A 
possible reason for this is that this way of thinking may have already become established 
as a matter of common knowledge and there was thus no need to reiterate it. In light of this 
circumstantial evidence, the notion that Sthiramati, Nanda, Dignāga, and Dharmapāla posited 
one, two, three, and four aspects of consciousness, respectively, must have originated with 
Kuiji. Thus, although it can be confirmed that Sthiramati was certainly familiar with the term 
svasaṃ√vid, there cannot be found in extant Sanskrit texts of Sthiramati’s commentaries any 
evidence to corroborate the assertion that he posited only the self-authenticating aspect of 
consciousness, an assertion that originated with Kuiji and became the orthodox view of Chi-
nese Vijñānavāda doctrine.8
　　In other words, the context from which Kuiji deduced Sthiramati’s one-aspect theory of 
consciousness and the context in which the four-aspect theory of consciousness is explained 
must be considered separately. At any rate, although the four-aspect theory is explained in 
the Cheng weishi lun, there is no mention of the thesis that Sthiramati, Nanda, Dignāga, and 
Dharmapāla posited one, two, three, and four aspects of consciousness, respectively, and it 
would seem natural to assume that Kuiji came to this conclusion on the basis of a passage dif-
ferent from that explaining the four-aspect theory.
　　Next, I wish to touch on the relationship between Sthiramati and Dignāga. It is known 
that Sthiramati’s commentary on the Madhyāntavibhāga shows a certain familiarity with the 
contents of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya. Dignāga’s definition of svārthānumāna is quoted 
in Sthiramati’s commentary with some redactional change and without being marked as a 
quotation (Yamaguchi ed.: 128.20f.; Pandeya ed.: 98.15f.). The corresponding section of the 
Pramāṇasamuccaya has been restored to Sanskrit from the Tibetan translation and is part 
of a “citation from another text used secondarily, that is not marked by the author as being 
a citation, with redactional change” (Steinkellner 2007: xxxv), which in this case refers to 
the Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti (translated by Vasudhararakṣita; P. no. 5701, 27b7). This section 
of the Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti is quoted in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya II (Steinkellner 
2007: 46.3) with some redactional change and without being marked as a quotation (trilakṣaṇāl 
liṅgād yad anumeye ’rthe jñānam, tat svārthānumānam). Similarly, part of the definition of 
parārthānumāna in chapter 3 of the Pramāṇasamuccaya (Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti, P. no. 5701, 
42b8–43a1) is quoted in Sthiramati’s commentary on the Madhyāntavibhāga (Yamaguchi ed.: 
128.26; Pandeya ed.: 98.20) in the form trirūpaliṅgākhyāna without any mention of the source.
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　　Sanskrit manuscripts of works attributed to Sthiramati continue to be discovered, 
and therefore the question of whether Sthiramati propounded a theory recognizing only 
svasaṃvedana requires further investigation, but it seems unlikely that he did so. This view 
would seem to be one that did not originate in India and was developed in Chinese Vijñānavāda 
doctrine, starting with Kuiji.
　　In the above we have surveyed the traditions underpinning the hitherto picture of Sthira-
mati, and it will have become evident that the narrative of Sthiramati as the author of several 
commentaries who was based at Valabhī, a centre of Buddhist studies on a par with Nālandā 
(Nanhai jigui neifa zhuan 南海寄歸内法傳, T54.229a5–7), and whose views were at variance 
with those of Dharmapāla, suggesting conflict between a Nālandā school of thought and a 
Valabhī school of thought, is by no means based on adequate grounds.
2. Grounds for Doubting the Existence of Only One Sthiramati
2.1. The Chinese Designations Anhui and Jianhui
　　It has been considered that the section on Valabhī in the Da Tang Daci’ensi sanzang 
fashi zhuan (T50.243b9ff.) mentions “Anhui” (T50.244a9), while the section on Valabhī in the 
Da Tang xiyuji (T51.936b16ff.) refers to “Jianhui” (T51.936c2). But is this in fact the case? 
Furthermore, the original Sanskrit equivalent of both Anhui and Jianhui is considered to be 
“Sthiramati” (cf. Digital Dictionary of Buddhism). This is because, on the one hand, the Chi-
nese transliteration given in the Cheng weishi lun shuji (T43.231c19–20: 三梵云悉恥羅末底。
唐言安慧) suggests that Chinese “Anhui” corresponds to Sanskrit “Sthiramati,” while sthira 
has the meaning of “firm,” similar to Chinese jian 堅, which means that it is possible to equate 
Chinese “Jianhui,” too, with “Sthiramati.”
　　There is, however, a need to reexamine the contents of the relevant passages in the Da 
Tang Daci’ensi sanzang fashi zhuan and Da Tang xiyuji. First, in the case of the former Anhui 
(T50.244a9) does not in fact appear in the section on Valabhī (T50.243b9–17) and is mentioned 
in the section on Magadha (Mojietuo 摩掲陀; T50.244a7–24) in connection with Shengjun 
(Jayasena), where it is stated that Shengjun, who was either Xuanzang’s teacher or his associ-
ate, studied under Jiexian (Śīlabhadra) and Anhui. In other words, in the Da Tang Daci’ensi 
sanzang fashi zhuan, written by Huili 慧立 and edited by Yancong 彦悰 on the basis of Xuan-
zang’s account, there is no mention of Anhui in the section on Valabhī, and consequently there 
is nothing to suggest any connection between Anhui and Valabhī.
　　Next, let us consider the reference to Jianhui in the section on Valabhī in the Da Tang 
xiyuji, which was set down in writing by Bianji 辯機 on the basis of Xuanzang’s account. In the 
Da Tang xiyuji, “Dehui 德慧 (Guṇamati) and Jianhui” are mentioned as scholars at Nālandā in 
Magadha (T51.924a2), and they are also mentioned in the section on Valabhī (T51.936c2). In 
the latter case, it is stated that “the bodhisattvas Dehui and Jianhui lodged there (i.e., Valabhī)” 
(T51.936c2–3: 德慧堅慧菩薩之所遊止), which suggests that Jianhui was not based at Valabhī. 
In other words, it would seem reasonable to assume that both of them were based at Nālandā.
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　　When we consider the contents of the above passages in the Da Tang Daci’ensi sanzang 
fashi zhuan and Da Tang xiyuji, the relationship between Anhui mentioned in the former and 
Jianhui mentioned in the latter turns out to be unclear.9
　　Care also needs to be taken when linking Anhui and Jianhui given as the authors of works 
translated into Chinese with the commentator Sthiramati. The Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun shu 
大乘法界無差別論疏 by Fazang 法藏 equates Jianhui with Suoluomodi 娑囉末底 (T44.63c5ff.: 
堅慧菩薩者。梵名娑囉末底。娑囉。此云堅固。末底云慧。......[3c19]造究竟一乘寶性論。
及法界無差別論等), which suggests Sāramati as the Sanskrit equivalent of Jianhui. When one 
considers that Fazang, a central figure in the Huayan 華嚴 school of Chinese Buddhism, had a 
tendency to attack Vijñānavāda doctrine, one needs to carefully consider whether the Sanskrit 
equivalent Sāramati can be accepted at face value or whether some hidden agenda should 
be read into it. It should also be taken into account that in this same passage Jianhui is given 
as the author of the Ratnagotravibhāga, as a result of which Jianhui is mentioned chiefly in 
Huayan works.
　　Meanwhile, the grounds for equating Anhui with Sthiramati are found in the Chinese 
transliteration given in the Cheng weishi lun shuji, quoted earlier. Anyone who has examined 
the writings of Kuiji will not be able to deny that his writings show considerable evidence of 
his own intents and purposes. Therefore, care is needed when determining the reliability of 
his citing of this Sanskrit equivalent of Anhui.10
　　In view of the above circumstances, the Chinese designations Anhui and Jianhui cannot 
be simplistically restored to Sanskrit “Sthiramati.” This means that when the author of works 
in the Chinese Buddhist canon is given as Anhui or Jianhui, one cannot posit a single person 
named Sthiramati. This is something that needs to be borne in mind when examining works 
attributed to Sthiramati.
2.2. Works Attributed to Sthiramati
Works preserved in the original Sanskrit and in Tibetan (and Chinese) translation
　(1) Sthiramati’s commentary on the Madhyāntavibhāga: Sanskrit text (edited by Lévi and 
Yamaguchi), Tibetan translation (P. no. 5534)
　(2) Sthiramati’s commentary on the Triṃśikā: Sanskrit text (edited by Lévi), Tibetan 
translation (P. no. 5565), Chinese translation (T. no. 1585)
　(3) Sthiramati’s commentary on the Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa: Sanskrit text (edited by 
Kramer), Tibetan translation (P. no. 5567), Chinese translation (T. no. 1613)
　(4) Sthiramati’s commentary on the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: Sanskrit text (edited by Oda-
ni et al.), Tibetan translation (P. no. 5875)
　(5) Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya: Sanskrit text (composed by Jinaputra [according to 
Tibetan translation]; edited by Tatia), Tibetan translation (composed by Jinaputra; P. no. 
5554), Chinese translation (compiled [rou 糅] by Anhui; T. no. 1606. The existence of a San-
skrit manuscript has been reported, and it may thus be treated as a Sanskrit text compiled 
by Sthiramati)
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Works preserved only in Tibetan translation
　　(6) Sthiramati’s commentary on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (P. no. 5531)
Works preserved only in Chinese translation
　　(7) Commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (T. no. 1567)
References to Anhui by Kuiji
　(8) Cheng weishi lun shuji (T. no. 1830), Weishi ershi lun shuji 唯識二十論述記 (T. no. 
1834), Bian zhongbian lun shuji 辯中邊論述記 (T. no. 1835), etc.
　　As was noted earlier, in Tibetan Buddhism questions were raised about whether the Sthi-
ramati who wrote a commentary on the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya was the same person as the 
author of the other commentaries attributed to Sthiramati. Since the discovery of Sanskrit 
manuscripts in recent years, joint research is being conducted on the basis of manuscripts of 
(3) (J. Kramer 2014), (4) (Odani Nobuchiyo et al.), and (5) (Li Xuezhu of the China Tibetol-
ogy Research Center et al.). Some of the researchers involved in this research are working 
on more than one of the texts and are in a position to exchange views with one another, and I 
have been informed that these works have points in common regarding Sthiramati’s Sanskrit 
terminology and commentarial methods.
　　With regard to (5), Li (2011) has reported that there are two manuscripts in the Norbu-
lingka Palace in Lhasa, one of which tallies with Xuanzang’s translation of a work said to have 
been compiled by Anhui (T. no. 1606), and currently the group engaged in the study of these 
manuscripts considers the Sanskrit text of the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya to be identical 
to Xuanzang’s Chinese translation. This Sanskrit text is also virtually the same as the Sanskrit 
text attributed to Jinaputra and edited by Tatia, and in this sense it is still not known whether 
it contains ideas distinctive of Sthiramati. But I have been told that, in light of the current state 
of research, texts (1), (2) and (5) give the impression of having all been written by the same 
person.
　　If one could gather together shared tendencies through an analysis of the Sanskrit texts 
of (1)–(5), it would be possible to identify Sthiramati’s ideas. It would presumably also be pos-
sible to discover how his interpretations differ from each of the texts on which he comments.
　　In the case of (6) and (7), on the other hand, of which the Sanskrit texts are not extant, 
there are problems concerning the translations into Tibetan and Chinese, respectively, and 
since the very fact that they are translations means that one cannot discount the possibility 
that they include the translators’ own interpretations, they need to be considered on the basis 
of the contents of their ideas. Further, assuming that the picture of Sthiramati (Anhui) preva-
lent in orthodox Chinese Vijñānavāda doctrine derives to a large extent from Kuiji, (8) will 
need to be considered collectively.
2.3. Ideas Associated with Sthiramati
　　I have already published several studies dealing with those ideas to be seen in works 
associated with Sthiramati that are taken up below.11 Therefore, I will leave details to these 
earlier studies and present only the main points here.
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　　If we focus on historical changes in the development of these theories, it would seem that 
since the contents of Sthiramati’s commentary on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra are similar to 
the orthodox views of Chinese Vijñānavāda doctrine originating in Xuanzang, this Sthiramati 
wrote this commentary near the time when Xuanzang was engaged in his translation activities. 
Further, the contents of Sthiramati’s commentaries on the Madhyāntavibhāga and Triṃśikā 
differ in that they present only ideas that were current in an earlier period, and so it has been 
difficult to regard their author as having been the same as the author of the commentary on 
the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra.
2.3.1. Correspondences between the Four Knowledges and Eight Consciousnesses
　　Correspondences between the four knowledges and eight consciousnesses are not 
found in Indian texts such as the verses of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and commentaries 
by Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva, the verses of the Madhyāntavibhāga and commentaries by 
Vasubandhu and Sthiramati, the verses of the Triṃśikā and Sthiramati’s commentary, and 
the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and commentaries by Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva. In Śīlabhadra’s 
Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna there are found only correspondences between ādarśajñāna and 
ālayavijñāna and between samatājñāna and kliṣṭaṃ manas. Among Indian texts, it is only 
Sthiramati’s commentary on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (preserved only in Tibetan transla-
tion) that presents the correspondences between the four knowledges and eight conscious-
nesses. Among Chinese translations, they can be seen already in Prabhākaramitra’s transla-
tion of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and Xuanzang’s translation of Asvabhāva’s commentary on 
the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. But the correspondences given in these two texts differ from the 
orthodox view of Chinese Vijñānavāda doctrine, with manovijñāna being associated with 
kṛtyānuṣṭhānajñāna and the five active consciousnesses with pratyavekṣājñāna. When Xuan-
zang later translated the Buddhabhūmiśāstra by Bandhuprabha et al.,12 he emended the above 
two correspondences to manovijñāna – pratyavekṣājñāna and five active consciousnesses – 
kṛtyānuṣṭhānajñāna. Sthiramati’s commentary on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (ad IX.12 and 
also IX.61ff.) coincides with this orthodox view of Chinese Vijñānavāda doctrine.13 Among 
Tibetan works, Ye shes sde’s Sangs rgyas gtso bo’i rgya cher ’grel pa (P. no. 5848), dPal brtsegs’s 
Chos kyi rnam grangs kyi brjed byang shes bya ba (P. no. 5849), etc., also coincide with the ortho-
dox view of Chinese Vijñānavāda doctrine,14 and therefore it is of course conceivable that when 
Sthiramati’s commentary was translated into Tibetan, the translator modified the original text. 
But with regard to the five gotras, too, Sthiramati’s commentary presents for the first time a 
five-gotra scheme identical to that of orthodox Chinese Vijñānavāda doctrine,15 and therefore, 
even taking into account the fact that there are problems with the Tibetan translation,16 it may 
be supposed that the Sanskrit text was similar in the content of its ideas to the orthodox views 
of Chinese Vijñānavāda doctrine.
　　To facilitate the reader’s understanding, the evolution of correspondences between the 
four knowledges and eight consciousnesses is presented below.
(1) No references in the works of Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva, predating Śīlabhadra
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(2) Śīlabhadra’s Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna (Tibetan translation)
ālayavijñāna → ādarśajñāna
kliṣṭaṃ manas → samatājñāna
manovijñāna → ?
(3) Prabhākaramitra’s translation of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and Xuanzang’s translation of 
Asvabhāva’s commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha
ālayavijñāna → ādarśajñāna
kliṣṭaṃ manas → samatājñāna
five consciousnesses →pratyavekṣājñāna
manovijñāna → kṛtyānuṣṭhānajñāna
(4) Sthiramati’s commentary on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (Tibetan translation), Xuanzang’s 
translations of the Buddhabhūmiśāstra and Cheng weishi lun, Ye shes sde’s Sangs rgyas gtso bo’i 
rgya cher ’grel pa, and dPal brtsegs’s Chos kyi rnam grangs kyi brjed byang shes bya ba
ālayavijñāna → ādarśajñāna
kliṣṭaṃ manas → samatājñāna
manovijñāna → pratyavekṣājñāna
five consciousnesses → kṛtyānuṣṭhānajñāna
2.3.2. Treatment of Āśraya-parivṛtti Thought
The contents of āśrayaparivṛtti thought can be classified into two types:
(a) āśraya-parivṛtti which incorporates a process of practice during which the practitioner 
passes through ascending stages and which involves transformation of the base of exis-
tence or a state in which the base of existence has been transformed;
(b) āśraya-parivṛtti which corresponds to only the final stage, a state in which the base 
of existence has been completely transformed and the practitioner becomes a buddha.
Āśraya-parivṛtti of the latter type is equated with tathatā and dharmadhātu. The formula stat-
ing that “the dharmakāya is characterized by āśraya-parivṛtti” holds only for type (b).
　　A difference in the interpretation of āśraya-parivṛtti can be seen in the Abhidharmasamuc-
caya (edited by Pradhan) and the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya (edited by Tatia).17 In brief, 
whereas the Abhidharmasamuccaya adopts an interpretation of āśraya-parivṛtti of type (b), 
which does not include the process of practice,18 stages of practice can be observed in the 
interpretation of āśraya-parivṛtti in the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya, and therefore it may 
be considered to have adopted interpretation (a), incorporating the process of practice. The 
following example is taken from Sakuma 1991.
　　In connection with the statement in the Abhidharmasamuccaya (66.16ff.) “duḥkhe 
dharmajñānaṃ katamat/ yena jñānena kṣāntyanantaraṃ vimuktiṃ sākṣātkaroti”19 in the sec-
tion on the stage of the path of insight (darśanamārga), the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya 
(77.5ff.) has: “tasmād ucyate duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣāntir iti/ tayā kṣāntyā duḥkha-darśana-
prahātavya-kleśa-prahāṇāt parivartita āśraye tadanantaraṃ yena jñānena tām āśrayaparivṛttiṃ 
pratyanubhavati tad duḥkhe dharmajñānam ity ucyate/.” In the Abhidharmasamuccaya, the 
???
哲学・思想論集第四十五号
52
path of insight is divided into the four truths (satya), each of which is further divided into four 
moments. According to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, in the first moment of the truth of suf-
fering one destroys the mental afflictions20 to be destroyed by observing suffering, and then 
in the second moment one realizes (sākṣātkaroti) emancipation (vimukti) by means of the 
knowledge gained in the first moment. In contrast, the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya brings 
āśraya-parivṛtti into the discussion. That is to say, in the first moment, as soon as suffering 
has been observed, the base of existence is made to undergo a change (parivartita āśraye), 
and this change is ascertained in the second moment. This means that the practitioner takes 
cognizance of this change, and since this may be assumed to include physical changes, it is 
evident that interpretation (a) of āśraya-parivṛtti, incorporating the process of practice, has 
been adopted.
　　In other sections, too, the interpretation of āśraya-parivṛtti in the Abhidharma-samuccaya-
bhāṣya incorporates the process of practice, and if the text compiled by Sthiramati adopted 
the Sanskrit text of the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya as it stands, it would mean that his 
interpretation of āśraya-parivṛtti was one that placed emphasis on interpretation (a). It is 
interesting to note that this interpretation is shared with Sthiramati’s commentaries on the 
Madhyāntavibhāga and Triṃśikā, to be considered next, of which the Sanskrit texts are extant.
　　Whereas Sthiramati’s commentaries on the Madhyāntavibhāga and Triṃśikā place empha-
sis on interpretation (a), the commentary on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, of which the Sanskrit 
text is no longer extant, places emphasis on interpretation (b). Let us next consider this point.
　　As is the case in the Sanskrit text of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra,21 one can detect a ver-
bal nuance in the noun āśraya-parāvṛtti as used in Sthiramati’s commentary on the Triṃśikā. 
Negative elements are to be excluded (nivṛtti), while parāvṛtti is used in connection with 
positive elements, and in this case it must be taken in the sense of the “acquisition” of positive 
elements. This differs from the Sanskrit text of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, in which parāvṛtti 
is used in the sense of the “exclusion” of negative elements, while labhyate is used for the 
acquisition of positive elements. It is to be surmised that the earlier nuances of “exclude” for 
parā√vṛt and “acquire” for pari√vṛt were lost, and both parā√vṛt and pari√vṛt were simply 
used in the sense of “A turns into B.”
　　There is no mention of āśraya-parivṛtti in the verses of the Madhyāntavibhāga or Vasu-
bandhu’s commentary, and the stages of practice are explained differently in accordance with, 
for example, the trisvabhāva theory. But in Sthiramati’s commentary they are interpreted in 
terms of āśraya-parivṛtti. One example of this can be seen in Sthiramati’s commentary on 
Madhyāntavibhāga I.16, a verse concerning śūnyatā, in which āśraya+a+parā√vṛt is explained 
in terms of samalā and āśraya-parā√vṛt in terms of nirmalā. The expression āśraya-aparā√vṛt 
does not, moreover, appear in early texts. The verb parā√vṛt lost its meaning of “exclude” 
or “acquire” and came to mean “change” in general, and it was only once the interpretation 
of āśraya-parā√vṛt had become established as that of āśraya-parivṛtti in the ultimate stage of 
practice that the expression aparā√vṛt, with the negative prefix a-, became possible. This is 
because it is only on the basis of interpretation (b), corresponding to ultimate āśraya-parivṛtti, 
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that a stage of practice can be referred to as a state in which no change has occurred. This 
would suggest that Sthiramati, cognizant of both interpretations of āśraya-parivṛtti, sought to 
read once again into āśraya-parivṛtti, regarding which the focus at the time was primarily on 
interpretation (b), the process of practice characteristic of interpretation (a).
　　The correspondences between the four knowledges and eight consciousnesses seen in 
the previous section are possible only in the case of interpretation (b) of āśraya-parivṛtti, and it 
is worth noting that Sthiramati’s commentaries on the Madhyāntavibhāga and Triṃśikā make 
no mention of these correspondences, which Sthiramati, who was familiar with interpretation 
(b), would have been sure to mention had he known of them. I previously thought that these 
correspondences were not dealt with in these commentaries because the base texts did not 
touch on buddha-jñāna. But now that it has become permissible to detect Sthiramati’s thought 
in the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya and it is to be surmised that he was a commentator who 
added his own interpretations to the texts on which he commented, it would not have been 
surprising had he incorporated the correspondences between the four knowledges and eight 
consciousnesses into his commentaries on the Madhyāntavibhāga and Triṃśikā in the same 
way in which he incorporated them into his commentary on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, cor-
respondences that had not been present in Asvabhāva’s commentary and earlier.
3. Was There Really Only One Commentator Named Sthiramati?
　　The commentator here under consideration is the Sthiramati who wrote commentaries 
on the Madhyāntavibhāga, Triṃśikā, and Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra.
　　(1) Even if one takes into account the fact that the former two commentaries incorporate 
the full scheme of eight consciousnesses, they postdate Vasubandhu, and since the Sthira-
mati who wrote the commentary on the Madhyāntavibhāga was familiar with the contents 
of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya, he must postdate Dignāga. But in view of the fact that 
neither of these two commentaries gives any indication of the correspondences between 
the four knowledges and eight consciousnesses, they presumably predate Śīlabhadra’s 
Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna. If Śīlabhadra was a leading scholar at Nālandā, there is a possibility 
that this scheme of correspondences was brought to completion after his composition of the 
Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna but during Xuanzang’s sojourn in Nālandā. But this scheme of cor-
respondences differs from that of orthodox Chinese Vijñānavāda doctrine. The commentary 
on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, which gives the same scheme of correspondences as that of 
orthodox Chinese Vijñānavāda doctrine, contains ideas close to those of the time when Xuan-
zang began his translations.
　　(2) As for the Sthiramati mentioned in the inscriptions from Valabhī, it would not pose 
any problems if the Sthiramati predating 588 C.E. and the Sthiramati predating 662 C.E. were 
different people. Moreover, were one to posit the Sthiramati predating 588 C.E. as the author 
of the commentaries on the Madhyāntavibhāga and Triṃśikā and the Sthiramati predating 662 
C.E. as the author of the commentary on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, one would be able to 
delineate an ideal chronology. There is, however, no evidence for directly linking these two 
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Sthiramatis to the former two commentaries and the third commentary, respectively. And, of 
course, I have no intention whatsoever of asserting that the author of the commentaries on the 
Madhyāntavibhāga and Triṃśikā was the Sthiramati predating 588 C.E. and the author of the 
commentary on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra was the Sthiramati predating 662 C.E.
　　The aim of the above investigations has been to demonstrate that, even when considered 
only in light of the above circumstantial evidence, the hitherto tacit understanding that there 
must have been only one Sthiramati has been acting as a sort of straitjacket. Taking into ac-
count the continuing discovery of Sanskrit manuscripts, and having freed ourselves from this 
straitjacket, we need to delineate a fresh picture of Sthiramati by carefully reexamining not 
only the above three commentaries, but also the contents of the other works listed in §2.2. If, 
as a result of further investigations, it is established that all of these works were written by a 
single person named Sthiramati, then so be it. But at least as matters currently stand, it is, I be-
lieve, difficult to suppose that the Anhui described in orthodox Chinese Vijñānavāda doctrine 
deriving from Kuiji, the Sthiramati mentioned in extant Sanskrit texts, and the commentator 
Sthiramati who wrote a commentary on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra preserved only in Tibetan 
translation were one and the same person. It is for this reason that I intend to continue pursu-
ing research on Sthiramati from such a viewpoint in collaboration with other researchers.
Postscript
　　This article is a translation of a slightly modified version of an earlier article of mine 
(Sakuma 2013a); in particular, the section on kliṣṭa-manas has been omitted because I noticed 
some shortcomings in its arguments. Born out of the research project “A Comprehensive 
Study of Sthiramati’s Thought,” funded with a grant-in-aid for scientific research from the 
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (research project no. 25284020), Sakuma 2013a 
delineated the kinds of problems that are associated with Sthiramati. I subsequently set about 
preparing another article titled “Was Sthiramati of Valabhī the Same Person as the Commen-
tator Sthiramati?” (to be published in Saṃbhāṣā 36, 2020) as part of the research project “A 
Comprehensive Elucidation of the Relationship between the Commentator Sthiramati, Anhui 
of Faxiang Doctrine, and Jianhui of Valabhī,” funded with another grant-in-aid for scientific re-
search (research project no. 17K02213), with the aim of demonstrating that Jianhui of Valabhī 
was a different person from the commentator Sthiramati and the figure Anhui mentioned in 
Chinese Vijñānavāda (Faxiang 法相) doctrine. But in the course of preparing this latter article, 
it became clear that Sakuma 2013a presented in a comprehensive fashion information that was 
indispensable as a premise for this latter article. Because Sakuma 2013a had been written in 
Japanese and was not accessible to those unable to read Japanese, I decided to revise those 
parts regarding which fresh information, mainly concerning Japanese research, had since 
come to light and have it translated into English. (It is for this reason that I do not refer to stud-
ies in English, etc., such as those by Jonathan Silk, Jowita Kramer, and others.) In particular, 
I wish to draw attention to the following two pieces of information that are important for the 
article focusing on Jianhui.
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　　First, I have learnt that the Apidamo zaji lun 阿毘達磨雜集論, which Xuanzang translated 
as a work “compiled by Anhui,” tallies with a Sanskrit manuscript that Li Xuezhu of the China 
Tibetology Research Center is in the process of editing, but regrettably the edited text has 
not yet been published. I myself have been unable to view the manuscript, but according to 
researchers who have been collaborating in editing the text, the manuscript itself does not 
appear to mention the name “Sthiramati.” It has become clear, in other words, that it has 
been provisionally attributed to Sthiramati only because the manuscript’s contents tally with 
Xuanzang’s translation. If it were explicitly stated in the manuscript that it had been written 
by Sthiramati, it would provide material evidence that Xuanzang had rendered “Sthiramati” 
as “Anhui,” but currently it is attributed to Sthiramati only because Xuanzang translated the 
compiler’s name as “Anhui.” In this sense, the grounds for supposing that the author of the 
original Sanskrit text of the Apidamo zaji lun was Sthiramati are merely circumstantial. But 
in view of the fact that this is the sole, important instance in which Xuanzang used the desig-
nation “Anhui” and it has been established by and large that this work is close in content to 
other Sanskrit works attributed to Sthiramati, it proves that Xuanzang knew of the existence of 
the commentator Sthiramati. It means, in other words, that Xuanzang differentiated between 
Sthiramati of Valabhī and the commentator Sthiramati.
　　Secondly, I wish to touch on the fact that there are two Sanskrit equivalents of the Chi-
nese designation “Jianhui,” namely, Sthiramati and Sāramati. For the reasons explained ear-
lier, Sthiramati of Valabhī was translated as “Jianhui” by Xuanzang, but, as noted, his disciple 
Kuiji not only gave the Chinese equivalent of the Chinese transliteration of “Sthiramati” as 
“Anhui,” but also added further details about him which Xuanzang had not mentioned at all. 
This shows that Kuiji failed to understand Xuanzang’s intentions and consequently confused 
Jianhui of Valabhī with Anhui of Chinese Vijñānavāda doctrine. In the history of Chinese 
Buddhism, the designation “Jianhui” has been used chiefly in the current of studies of the 
Avataṃsaka-sūtra (Huayan jing 華嚴經), and it is said that “Jianhui” corresponds to Sanskrit 
“Sāramati,” which means that he was a separate person from Sthiramati. Fazang was severely 
critical of the Chinese Vijñānavāda school and also attributed the Ratnagotravibhāga to Jian-
hui, as a result of which in studies of the Avataṃsaka-sūtra Jianhui came to be regarded as a 
proponent of tathāgatagarbha thought. It was for this reason that the Japanese scholar-monk 
Fujaku 普寂, who belonged to this current of Avataṃsaka-sūtra studies, stated in his Ken’yō 
shōbō fukko shū 顯揚正法復古集 that “the two great men Maming (*Aśvaghoṣa) and Jianhui 
expounded tathāgatagarbha” (Dai Nihon Bukkyō zensho 大日本仏教全書 29: 177c̶馬鳴・堅
慧二大士則説如來藏). In June 2018 Kitsukawa Chishō presented a paper titled “Reexamining 
the Yogācāra Lineage” at the annual conference of the Society for Buzan Studies, and because 
it has important bearings on my forthcoming article on Jianhui, including the influence of 
this Huayan lineage (Kitsukawa 2019). Taking this into account, my forthcoming article will 
demonstrate that Jianhui of Valabhī was a completely different person from the commentator 
Sthiramati and the Anhui of Chinese Vijñānavāda doctrine.
　　In this forthcoming article, I discuss why Jianhui of Valabhī, the commentator Sthiramati, 
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and Anhui of Chinese and Japanese Vijñānavāda doctrine came to be confused with one anoth-
er. First, I argue that it can be inferred from the Da Tang xiyuji, etc., that Xuanzang deliberate-
ly translated the name of Sthiramati of Valabhī as “Jianhui,” not “Anhui,” because he knew of 
the existence of a person called Sthiramati in Valabhī, such as is mentioned in the copperplate 
inscriptions, but realized that he was a different person from the commentator Sthiramati. As 
well, it can also be inferred from the Da Tang xiyuji, etc., that although Xuanzang knew there 
were monasteries in Valabhī, he did not evince any great interest in them. Secondly, contrary 
to Xuanzang’s intentions, his disciple Kuiji retranslated the name of Sthiramati of Valabhī as 
“Anhui” and stated that he was the Anhui who had been in conflict with the Dharmapāla of the 
Vijñānavāda school, whereafter Yijing 義淨 endorsed this in his Nanhai jigui neifa zhuan, and 
it would seem that as a result there was established a schema of doctrinal controversy between 
Sthiramati and Dharmapāla. It is to be surmised that in modern times the well-known mne-
monic about the four aspects of consciousness transmitted by the Japanese Hossō sect and the 
Jianhui mentioned by Fujaku became mixed up and in Japanese Buddhist studies Jianhui of 
Valabhī, the commentator Sthiramati, and Anhui of Vijñānavāda doctrine all came to be regard-
ed as one and the same person. If Buddhist studies in Europe at the time had learnt of Kuiji’s 
and Yijing’s accounts directly from their writings, it would mean that Stanislas Julien restored 
the name Jianhui as “Sthiramati” in his French translation of the Da Tang xiyuji independently 
of Japanese traditions. But when one takes into account the fact that in his English translation 
of the Da Tang xiyuji Samuel Beal makes special mention of B. Nanjio, i.e., Nanjō Bun’yū 南條
文雄, who was familiar with these Japanese traditions, it would seem that the above confusion 
became firmly entrenched on account of statements by Bühler and Japanese Hossō doctrine. 
This point is demonstrated in my forthcoming article on Jianhui.
　　It should be noted that, owing to questions concerning its content, §2.3.3 on kliṣtaṃ ma-
nas in Sakuma 2013a has been omitted in this English version. I would also like to thank Rolf 
Giebel for having undertaken the translation.
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Notes
─────────────
1 According to Matsumoto Bunzaburō (1926: 34–45), Xuanzang’s age at the time of his death is to be 
calculated in the following way. All traditional biographies of Xuanzang agree that he was ordained in 
Wude 武德 5 (622) at the age of twenty (or twenty-one by traditional reckoning), and since this tallies with 
Xuanzang’s statement in Linde 麟德 1 (664) shortly before his death that “my age is sixty-three” (吾行年
六十有三), Matsumoto determined that, counting backwards, Xuanzang must have been born in Renshou 
仁壽 2 (602). The statement “my age is sixty-three” is recorded in the Da Tang gu sanzang Xuanzang fashi 
xingzhuang, which records Xuanzang’s words and deeds on his deathbed and is therefore the most reliable 
record in this regard. Confusion regarding Xuanzang’s age at the time of his death subsequently arose 
because in his biography of Xuanzang in the Xu gaoseng zhuan 續高僧傳 Daoxuan 道宣 suggested that he 
died at the age of sixty-five (行年六十有五矣). But Matsumoto argues convincingly that the figure “five” 
(五) is a scribal error for “three” (三), a view that has also been endorsed by Yoshimura (1995: 101–102), 
and it is now established that Xuanzang’s dates were 602–664. These dates had already been established 
when Ui wrote his 1965a article.
2 Yuiki identified a passage in the Shōdaijōronshaku ryakusho 攝大乘論釋略疏 by Fujaku 普寂 (1707–81) 
(T. no. 2269, 68.121b22ff.) as the source of the legend that “Paramārtha belonged to Anhui’s lineage.”
3 The Sthiramati mentioned in the Blue Annals (Roerich 1949) either has ties with Valabhī or is not a 
commentator, and therefore he would seem to be a different person from the Sthiramati here under con-
sideration.
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4 See Sakuma 2012: 34–35.
5 See Hattori 1968: 110n1.74. The corresponding passage in Jinendrabuddhi’s Viśālāmalavatī 
Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā cited by Hattori appears in Steinkellner et al. 2005: 83.14ff.̶svasaṃvedyatā vety 
anenāntaroktāyā evopapatteḥ sādhyāntaram āha/ na kevalaṃ smṛter uttarakālaṃ dvairūpyaṃ siddhaṃ 
jñānasya, api tu svasaṃvedanam api,… The existence of svasaṃ√vid can thus be confirmed. In addi-
tion, there also appear svasaṃvitti (ibid.: 69.5 [I.9a]) and svasaṃvedana (ibid.: 69.14 [I.9ab]), and the 
original Sanskrit equivalents of zizheng fen 自證分 (self-authentication) can be ascertained in Dignāga’s 
Pramāṇasamuccaya.
6 Here and below, English translations of quotations from the Cheng weishi lun have been adapted from 
Cook 1999: 62–64.
7 Here I have sought out passages in the Cheng weishi lun that might corroborate the headnote in the 
Shindō edition (vol. 1: 3). But if we examine the text of the Cheng weishi lun without any such ulterior 
motives, there are passages in which it would seem possible to assign the “one part” to something other 
than “self-authentication.” In other words, rather than being an interpretation based on the Cheng weishi 
lun itself, there is a strong possibility that the orthodox view of Chinese Vijñānavāda doctrine, equating 
Anhui’s “one part” with “self-authentication,” derives from Kuiji’s interpretation.
8 Sthiramati’s commentary on the Madhyāntavibhāga (Yamaguchi ed.: 162.17; Pandeya ed.: 122.16) has 
svasaṃvedyā ity ākhyātum aśakyatvād udgraha ucyate/, but this is unrelated to the one-aspect theory. No 
expressions related to svasaṃ√vid are to be found in Sthiramati’s commentary on the Triṃśikā (Lévi ed.) 
or in the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya (attributed to Jinaputra; ed. Tatia).
9 On the designations Anhui and Dehui, including their Sanskrit equivalents, see Yoshimura 2013.
10 What follows is mere speculation, but when one disregards the referents of “Anhui” and “Jianhui” and 
considers them purely as Chinese designations, one finds that they appear in a list of bodhisattvas at the 
start of the Zhengqi dasheng jing 證契大乘經 (T. no. 674, 16.653a14–18: 其名曰聖者彌勒菩薩。大慧菩薩。
勝慧菩薩。堅慧菩薩。寂慧菩薩。無盡慧菩薩。無邊慧菩薩。海慧菩薩。安慧菩薩。無垢慧菩薩。智慧
菩薩). This sūtra is said to have been translated by the Indian Trepiṭaka Divākara during the Tang period, 
and in this case “Jianhui” and “Anhui” must have corresponded to different Sanskrit names. However, in 
the Dasheng tongxing jing 大乘同性經, considered to be another translation of the same text by the Indian 
Trepiṭaka Jñānayaśas during the Northern Zhou dynasty, the same passage is rendered somewhat dif-
ferently (T. no. 673, 16.640c17–22: 其名曰聖者彌勒菩薩摩訶薩。大意菩薩摩訶薩。益意菩薩摩訶薩。堅
意菩薩摩訶薩。定意菩薩摩訶薩。無盡意菩薩摩訶薩。無邊意菩薩摩訶薩。海意菩薩摩訶薩。正定意菩
薩摩訶薩。淨意菩薩摩訶薩。智意菩薩摩訶薩). In this case, too, the original Sanskrit names must have 
been different, although I have no intention of linking them to Sthiramati and Sāramati. Xuanzang himself 
translated the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya as a work “compiled by the Bodhisattva Anhui,” and although 
it may be possible to equate this Anhui with the Sthiramati here under consideration, the problem is that, 
because there is a possibility that Fazang was involved in the translation of the Zhengqi dasheng jing, one 
cannot discount the possibility that he had some reason for presenting a transliteration corresponding to 
Sāramati in his Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun shu. It is, at any rate, evident that it is a quite risky undertaking 
to determine the original Sanskrit equivalent from Chinese translations.
11 On correspondences between the four knowledges and eight consciousnesses, see Sakuma 2012; on the 
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treatment of āśraya-parāvṛtti, see Sakuma 2011; and on the treatment of kliṣṭaṃ manas, see Sakuma 2013b.
12 Together with specialists in Indian, Tibetan, and Chinese Buddhism, I am currently engaged in a joint 
comparative study of the Tibetan translation of Śīlabhadra’s Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna and Xuanzang’s 
translation of the Buddhabhūmiśāstra by Bandhuprabha et al. It is well known that Xuanzang’s translation 
contains a great many additional passages when compared with the Tibetan translation. But even if it is 
true that Xuanzang’s translations of those passages tallying with the Tibetan translation were modified 
in line with his own aims, it is becoming clear in light of the extremely close correspondences between 
the two translations that Xuanzang used Śīlabhadra’s Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna as his base text, to which 
he added additional passages summarizing the wealth of knowledge he had absorbed during his stay 
in India. Most of the passages tallying with the Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna did not become part of ortho-
dox Chinese Vijñānavāda doctrine, and this was perhaps one of the reasons that Xuanzang attributed the 
Buddhabhūmiśāstra to “Bandhuprabha et al.” rather than to his own teacher Śīlabhadra.
13 See Sakuma 2012: 41–48.
14 See Sakuma 1984: 136–137.
15 See Sakuma 2007.
16 As noted in Ueno 2011, the Tibetan translator himself states in his colophon that he was unable to fully 
understand Sthiramati’s commentary on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, and it cannot be guaranteed that the 
Tibetan translation faithfully reflects the contents of the original Sanskrit text.
17 See Sakuma 1991.
18 As pointed out in Sakuma 1991, as far as I can tell, in the Abhidharmasamuccaya āśraya-parāvṛtti is men-
tioned in five passages, all of which may be assumed to reflect interpretation (b): (1) nirantarāśrayaparivṛtti 
in the section on niṣṭhāmārga, (2) three kinds of āśraya-parāvṛtti in the section on nirantarāśrayaparivṛtti, 
(3) kāryapariniṣpatti as the fourth of the four vyāpyālambana, (4) āśraya as the fifth of the five yogabhūmi, 
and (5) the first item in the section on phalaviśeṣa.
19 Emended on the basis of Li 2014: 197; Wogihara 1932: 170.
20 “Mental affliction” has been provisionally used to translate kleśa. Cf. Schmithausen 1987, 2: 246–247n21.
21 See Sakuma 1996.
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